Abstract-Location-based services (LBSs) are becoming increasingly important to the success and attractiveness of next-generation wireless systems. However, a natural tension arises between the need for user privacy and the flexible use of location information. In this paper, we present a framework to support privacy-enhanced LBSs. We classify the services according to several basic criteria, and we propose a hierarchical key distribution method to support these services. The main idea behind the system is to hierarchically encrypt location information under different keys, and distribute the appropriate keys only to group members with the necessary permission. Four methods are proposed to deliver hierarchical location information while maintaining privacy. We propose a key tree rebalancing algorithm to maintain the rekeying performance of the group key management. Furthermore, we present a practical LBS system implementation. Hierarchical location information coding offers flexible location information access which enables a rich set of LBSs. Our load tests show such a system is highly practical with good efficiency and scalability.
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INTRODUCTION
L OCATION-BASED services (LBSs) are one of the most desirable classes of service expected to be offered in future wireless systems. Service providers envision offering many new services based on user location as well as augmenting many existing services with location information.
A natural tension arises when attempting to protect user privacy while building a system that allows for flexible use of location information. Specifically, an LBS system must be able to provide means to protect the privacy of a user's location. Great effort has been given to protect user identity and location within basic cellular communication services. This protection must not be compromised with the addition of LBS. Flexibility is also essential so that new services may be introduced and modified quickly. However, providing flexible access to location information will weaken user privacy if care is not taken.
Our solution is based on the following philosophy: access to location information should be controlled by the user. The user defines a group of entities that are allowed to access its location information called a location information group. This group may include other users and servers in the network that use the location information to provide intelligent services. To increase flexibility, our system supports the hierarchical coding of location information so that different group members may have access to only the granularity of location information required to deliver the appropriate service.
Our approach is based on providing members of the location information group keys (GKs) that allow them to decrypt location information. The architecture we propose supports loose coupling with a network, thus allowing thirdparty control. Emerging social and community networks are especially promising platforms for LBSs deployment. Most next-generation LBSs are based on location or proximity sharing with groups. These services consist of groups with different sizes and have various service requirements.
Our framework supports location privacy control by the user. The architecture supports a range of trust models that trade off user control and scalability. The flexible location privacy policies are enforced by multilevel GK management. It is challenging to efficiently distribute the keys in the face of changing group membership while supporting hierarchical location information. There is a trade-off in complexity of key management, multicast group management, and delivery overhead depending on the group dynamics.
This paper presents an architecture, implementation, and evaluation of a system for providing privacy-enhanced LBS with service flexibility. The following is a summary of the contributions and results in this paper:
. We present an architecture to support flexible LBSs while maintaining location privacy. The architecture allows users to share their location information at different levels of granularity and with different levels of user control. We map this architecture onto emerging LBSs. . We propose four different methods to support hierarchical location information dissemination to provide flexible location privacy control. To show how this hierarchy can be supported, we propose extensions to one suitable key distribution protocol, Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) [1] , to enable efficient rekeying through the application of the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [2] , [3] protocol. We further tailor the protocol according to four different hierarchical location information dissemination methods and analyze the protocol efficiency. . We design, implement, and extensively evaluate a modified balanced binary key tree (M_AVL) rebalancing algorithm which maintains rekeying performance when used with GK management. We further propose a batch group member removal scheme to optimize the rekeying overhead. When using M_AVL, the key tree is 15 percent shorter on average than when no rebalancing is performed. Furthermore, if batch leaving is supported multicast traffic is reduced by more than 50 percent. We also show how trade-offs may be made in terms of location privacy and performance. . We implement an LBS system extending the concepts we propose. This includes defining and implementing APIs for a variety of service functions and the detailed protocols for the MIKEY-LKH-based GK management protocol. To examine the scalability and the efficiency of the system, we conduct comprehensive load tests for large group services. . To exercise the APIs and show the utility of the system, we implement two basic services, LocateFriends and BuddyAlert, which represent the location sharing and the proximity service, respectively, on the application server (AS) as enhancements to instant message (IM) services. We also demonstrate the trade-off of different policy enforcements with regard to different service requirements. . Finally, we extend our system by integrating an open-service architecture on which our system can be mapped. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related research. Section 3 presents an overview of our system. In Section 4, we describe the details of hierarchical coding and location information delivery. Section 5 presents our group management schemes and shows the analysis results. In Section 6, we define the protocol and key tree rebalancing algorithm in details. Section 7 demonstrates the system implementation and privacy protection options. Section 8 explores the performance of the system implementation. We enhance the system with the open-service architecture in Section 9. We conclude in Section 10.
RELATED WORK
LBSs and applications have been emerging with the rapid development of indoor and outdoor positioning technologies such as GPS and RFID. Localization systems such as POLS [4] have been developed to support end device controlled location determination. Standards exist in both the 3G [5] and IETF [6] arenas. In particular, the IETF geopriv group identifies the need to securely gather and transfer location information for location services, while at the same time protecting the privacy of the individuals involved. They do not identify the requirements for LBSs in future large-scale community and social networks. No group-based privacy control solution is identified and no user-based solution is proposed. Parlay/OSA provides a standardized, extendable, and scalable interface that enables rapid creation of telecommunication services which can be used to build integrated LBSs [5] .
Distributed trust models in pervasive computing have been extensively studied [7] , [8] , [9] . In [7] , the relationships among general information access are integrated in a certificate-based access control scheme. In [8] , an omnipresent trust model based on multihop recommendation and a behavioral model to handle interactions are proposed for pervasive environments. In [9] , a Bayesian framework for trust formation and evolvement in pervasive computing is presented. These models can be used to form or bundle the access control of location information.
There are concerns on how to protect location privacy while still providing the benefits of LBS. Previous work can be classified into two different approaches: solutions based on privacy policies [10] , [11] , [6] , and those based on a location anonymizer [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] . The latter provides fuzzy location to make the identification of a device unlinkable to its location. The main drawback of this method is that it may lead to inferior quality of service when accurate location information is desired. Also, anonymization is not effective when there is no mutual trust between the user and the central anonymity server. A more recent work [17] presents user controllable privacy policies in a People Finder Application. We present a framework that can fully support location privacy control by the end device.
SmokeScreen [18] proposes mechanisms to share presence among trusted parties by broadcasting clique beacons, and with strangers by delegating privacy control to a broker. It uses cryptographic methods to protect the presence information. It does not specify how the common GK is set up or address rekeying when membership is revoked.
One important aspect of group communication security is access control, which can be achieved by encrypting the communication content using a secret key known to all group members. Many GK management protocols have been proposed to support these solutions. Solutions may be classified based on the existence of a Key Distribution Center, which is responsible for the key generation, and whether key management and distribution are centralized or distributed [2] .
In a centralized system, there is only one entity controlling the group; protocols for these systems are often based on logical key trees, e.g., LKH [3] , [2] , One-way Function Tree (OFT) [19] , or Efficient Large-Group Key (ELK) [20] . The best solutions appear to be those using a hierarchical tree of key-encrypting keys. They achieve good overall results without compromising any aspects of security. We extend LKH to support multiple level location information encryption. Our extensions can be modified to adapt to other logical key trees based schemes as well.
Key tree rebalance is important to maintain the rekeying performance of GK management. A method proposed in [21] is based on the AVL tree. The technique does not take into account backward security requirements. Moyer et al. [22] propose two enhancements to rebalance the key tree after removing a member. Our scheme is based on a modified balance binary tree in which the key tree balance is maintained by swapping subtrees. This approach incurs less rekeying overhead.
Hao et al. [23] propose to use a leaving tree in addition to an AVL tree sorted by departure time where a member's departure time is known in advance. Zhu et al. [24] propose two optimizations for the LKH scheme based on the temporal patterns or the loss probabilities of group members in addition to batch rekeying. We adopt the batch removal scheme to further optimize the rekeying performance.
SOLUTION OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the LBS architecture, give an example of location information dissemination, discuss the service scope, trust and threat model, and illustrate location sharing in social networks with simple services using this architecture.
Service Architecture and Trust Model
The architecture we propose is shown in Fig. 1 . This architecture includes the basic functions required to provide an LBS and does not imply a physical implementation or deployment.
The user device may generate, or assist in generating, its own location information, and may receive the location of other users as part of a service. To be able to correctly receive the location information of a client, the recipient must be a member in a location information group controlled by the client. The location information group defines the members that receive location information at a particular granularity. Access to the location information by a group is controlled through the distribution of keys that decrypt the location information.
The architecture supports a range of control by the user. In the most highly controlled case, the user generates their own location information and encrypts it, and distributes keys directly to the other members of the location information group using a protocol like Diffie-Hellman (DH), or even running a GK management protocol as described later in this paper. This solution is feasible for small information groups. For larger groups, the user may form a trust relationship with a server in the network. Depending on the level of trust, the server(s) may have more or less access to the location information. At one level, the user may allow the network to store and distribute its location information in an encrypted form and still manage key distribution itself. If the user has more trust in the network, it may inform a server of the members of the location information group and allow the server to perform key distribution and location information dissemination on its behalf.
The Location Server (LS) is a network server that stores location information. If the LS is a member of the location information group, it may also process the location information. The group server (GS) manages the location information groups that are to receive the location information including both users and network servers. If it is not trusted by the user, this just entails managing the multicast delivery of the encrypted location information to the members of the group. If it is trusted, the GS also manages the distribution of the keys to the location information group. The ASs provide the end service which uses the location information. These functions may be combined in various ways in a network deployment.
One important aspect of this system is the hierarchical coding of location information to allow efficient and flexible location information access control. When location information is generated, for example using GPS or TDOA techniques, it will typically be in a ðx; yÞ format. This information may then be processed to produce a set of information of differing granularity, for example fcountry; state; city; address; ðx; yÞg. This processing may be done on the end device or it may be done inside the network at the LS if the user has a trust relationship with this server. Our approach is based on providing members of the location information GKs that allow them to decrypt location information. A user may approve sharing of only the granularity of location information that they desire, and ASs will only have access to the information required to provide their service. The access is granted through the GK management protocol.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume there are five classes of location information, with class 1 corresponding to the most general representation of user location, and class 5 corresponding to the most specific. Fig. 1 shows a representative example of location information dissemination. In this example, location information is generated by the end device and uploaded into the LS (message 1). The AS requests the location information from the LS on-demand (message 2), and sends it to the GS from which it is disseminated to the users (message 3). This way, the AS is only concerned with triggers to disseminate the information, and the GS is responsible for managing group membership. In an actual deployment, these functions may be combined for the most efficient operation.
Location Information Dissemination
It is important to note that when information is stored in the LS, it is not necessarily accessible by the LS. For example, location information may be generated at the end device, perhaps using GPS, encrypted, and then uploaded to the LS. In this case, the LS will store the information and help disseminate it, thus relieving the end device of this burden, but will not be able to add value to any service. Alternatively, the LS may be a member of a location information group, and be able to decrypt the information and process it, thus adding value to the services. In this case, the LS must have a trust relationship with the user.
Finally, consider that certain ASs are members of the location information group. These ASs may add their own processing to further increase the intelligence of the services they provide. By supporting hierarchical coding of the location information, they may only be allowed to access the level of information they required for their service.
The flow in Fig. 1 is easily modified to support scenarios in which no LS is present, or in which the location information is pushed to the ASs at a specified frequency or in response to a specified event.
Services Scope and Threat Model
In this section, we revisit the requirements of different LBSs and evaluate how our architecture accommodates their needs.
The first-generation LBSs are mostly "finder services" which show the users a nearby single point of interest. These services are provided by a server based on selfreferenced, single-target, and sporadic pull location access. Location privacy is provided by a degree of anonymity by many of these systems. Next-generation emerging LBSs include location sharing and proximity-based entertainment, community, and social network services. These services consist of large groups and require the delivery of location information to multiple targets with various location access granularities. They are typically push based.
The framework we propose fits the best for this promising class of service. The traditional LBS architecture is network centric, where location information is tightly coupled to specific network operators and not open to the third-party LBS providers. We present an architecture which is end device centric and loosely coupled where the location access is through an open-service architecture based on a layer of middleware which is accessible to the third-party service providers and users. This architecture adds a GS to provide location access control. Another benefit of this architecture is that the LS can be loosely coupled with the core network. This is essential to support LBSs in heterogeneous networks. Our implementation in Section 7 includes all the system components in the architecture.
In our system, an adversary is defined as any party who is not trusted to record a user's location at a specific granularity and time based on these trust parameters. Our scheme is resilient to this threat since the location information is encrypted and no information is leaked to eavesdroppers. Our scheme is resilient to collusion among adversaries, and is also resilient to collusion between adversaries and trusted users for instantaneous location tracking if we change the GKs frequently. However, we cannot prevent trusted users from unauthorized sharing of secret keys or location information with adversaries.
Location Sharing in Social Network and Service Examples
There are several emerging online social network services such as Friendster, MySpace, and Facebook. As of 18 December 2007, over 300 million MySpace accounts were registered [25] . Friendster currently has 50 million users [26] . Facebook has over 59 million active users worldwide, and more than 80 percent of Facebook members have used at least one of the 7,000 applications built on the platform [27] . Typical users of Facebook often have social networks of over 100 users [28] . Community services are becoming more popular. Combined with location information, these networks can provide new platforms for emerging mobile community services. Other location-based game and community services are targeting both large and small groups, with high location privacy requirements and high group dynamics. One promising set of applications is Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) [29] . Botfighters2 [30] and CitiTag [31] are examples of such games which make use of user location and collaboration among members. With more than one hundred thousand players, Botfighters2 is attractive to people who like to play online games in groups through their mobile cell phones. A greater degree of location accuracy and social interaction is required to attain their design goals. One of most famous MMORPG, World of Warcraft (WoW), has over nine million subscribers worldwide [32] . Players join guilds (groups) in order to conduct raids against enemy territories and instances. The average guild size is around 20 and the largest guilds have more than 200 [33] members.
Social networks and their service models are still emerging. Many issues related to privacy are just now being addressed because such large communities online have not existed before. Therefore, it is difficult to assume a single model of user behavior among different applications in social networks. Real-time transient entertainment applications are becoming more common in Facebook (such as "Track Santa") which require low latency group dynamics.
Most of these services are based on sharing the location or proximity information of a group of users. This sharing is the core building block for advanced services. In the following, we describe how the basic location proximity service can be implemented and the impact of each of the different deployment options discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 on the operation of the service.
The service works as follows. An alert message is sent to subscribers when a buddy is within a certain proximity. The service can be integrated with an IM system or social network service system (e.g., Facebook) which requests the location information of its subscribers from the LS.
We first consider the case in which only the users are members of the location information group, i.e., the IM server or social network server is not a member of the location information group. In this case, the server plays the role of the AS in Fig. 1 and requests location information from the LS periodically. The LS provides the encrypted information to the server, which sends it to the GS to be disseminated to all members of the buddy list (or guild, for example). The end devices of these subscribers decrypt the information, compare it to their own location, and generate an alert locally if a buddy is within proximity of the device.
This implementation of the service has two interesting characteristics. First, the user has complete control over which buddies know its location information; it may decide to limit the knowledge of its location to a subset (or none) of its buddies. Second, the value-added service of proximity detection is implemented primarily in the end device; the server is simply facilitating the delivery of the information. Now consider the case in which the server is a member of the location information group. In this case, when the server receives the location information from the LS, it will decrypt the information, compare it to the location of the other members of the buddy list, and execute directed alerts to only those members that are within proximity of each other. This implementation has three important characteristics. First, the user must trust the server to only disclose its location information to approved buddies. Second, the delivery of alerts is more efficient than in the user-based system discussed above, especially for large groups. And third, the server is able to provide increased value to the service without placing a burden on the end device.
DELIVERY OF HIERARCHICAL LOCATION INFORMATION
In this section, we discuss four methods of delivering hierarchical location information. Each method has tradeoffs in terms of message delivery efficiency and group management complexity. We discuss the key distribution schemes and demonstrate the analysis results in Section 5.
We present the protocol in detail in Section 6. The interaction between hierarchical coding of location information and GK management is critical for overall system performance. Therefore, in this paper, different schemes are extensively evaluated in our real LBS system in Section 8.
Coding by information class. In this method, each class of location information, i, is encrypted with its own key, K i , and location information groups are assigned based on a single class of information. With this system, a user requiring all c levels of location information will join all c groups and receive each piece of information independently of the others. The class i message has a message format fLoc i g <K i > . This scheme is suitable when users typically desire a single class of location information. However, it requires the management of c groups, and if users require more than one class of information, they must join more than one group. Each user will receive c multicast messages; one for each group to which it belongs.
Coding by group. In this method, a group is defined by the highest class of location information accessible to that group; a group receives all location information at or below this class encrypted by a single key, Kg i . The group i message takes a message format fLoc 1 ; Loc 2 ; . . . ; Loc i g <Kgi> . This method is suitable when users want more than a single class of information. It uses longer messages than coding by class, but requires users to join fewer groups.
Nested hierarchy coding. In this method, location information is encrypted using a nested hierarchy. Users belong to a location information group according to the maximum level of information they require. Each group has a GK Kg i . Formally, the information is disseminated with a message format, fLoc 1 ; . . . ; fLoc i ; . . . ; fLoc c g <Kgc> . . .g <Kgi> . . .g <Kg1> . With this method, only a single multicast group for location delivery must be maintained, and the separation of groups is solely dependent on distributing keys.
Flat coding. This scheme assumes a flat relationship among subgroups. Each member of a location information group receives all of the information at or below the maximum level it requires. The message format for location information delivery to a class c user is ffLoc 1 g <Kg1> ; . . . ; fLoc i g <Kgi> ; . . . ; fLoc c g <Kgc> g. All the location information for a single class of user is included in each message. Each class of user receives messages that only contain up to that class of information; thus, the number of multicast groups managed is equal to the number of location classes.
GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT
As is evident, a main element of the system is the ability to distribute keys to the appropriate group members. The key distribution protocol must accommodate the hierarchical coding methods discussed in Section 4. The efficiency of the keying protocol will vary depending on group size and group dynamics. It is natural to apply GK management protocols used for multicast communication or collaborative systems to this problem. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 introduce the key distribution schemes and analyze the efficiency. Batch rekeying and rekeying under fine-grain privacy configurations are also explored to demonstrate the flexibility of the privacy control. We summarize the analysis evaluation at the end of Section 5.2.
Within the IETF, there are several standards or draft standards that address key management for groups. These include the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI-RFC3547) [34] , GSAKMP (RFC4535) [35] , and MIKEY (RFC3830) [1] . Table 1 compares these three protocols for a small set of important characteristics.
We choose to extend MIKEY [1] as a representative key management protocol because it is a lightweight protocol that can establish GKs with a low latency and has been adopted by the 3G Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Services (MBMS). Note that the latest GSAKMP and GDOI protocols also recommend LKH in their rekeying schemes and may also be suitably extended.
The MIKEY protocol specifies only the basic registration protocol. Three different methods can be chosen to establish or transport GKs in order to satisfy the system requirements: with the use of a preshared key, public-key encryption, and DH key exchange. The preshared case is the most efficient way to handle the key transport due to the use of symmetric cryptography only. In future integrated networks, users can benefit from the preshared keys with the primary network, for example using the existing architecture in 3G networks. If the services are only provided within small size group and without central server, peer-to-peer DH key exchange can be used and rekeying can reuse the basic protocol. The network components can be simplified accordingly.
In summary, there are two limitations of MIKEY. First, it does not support a hierarchy of GK servers which may be important to scale the solution. Second, it does not support rekeying which is essential because group members may leave or join, and thus new keys must be established. We address these limitations in Section 5.1 after providing a brief overview of MIKEY and LKH.
MIKEY-LKH Applied to Key Distribution
Schemes MIKEY uses a three-level key management structure to distribute GKs to the clients. The User Key (MUK) is a point-to-point key between the multicast server and each client. This key is used by the key server to authenticate each client and secure the delivery of MSK. The Service Key (MSK) is shared between the multicast server and all group members. The MSK protects the distribution of Traffic Key (MTK). The MTK is the GK used to protect the data exchanged between members of the group. The MSK is delivered to the group members after they are authenticated. Delivery of this key is point-to-point through push, pull, or push solicited pull. The MTK traffic key delivery can utilize a multicast mechanism. Because MIKEY does not support rekeying, each time a group member joins or leaves, a new MSK must be established with all group members, and a new MTK must be multicast to the entire group. Therefore, the overhead for rekeying is OðNÞ, and is not scalable to large groups.
We apply LKH to MIKEY to improve scalability with rekeying. The LKH protocol uses a balanced tree to represent a logical key tree, as shown in Fig. 2 . Each user owns the keys on the path from the leaf node to the root of the tree. The keys on the path between the leaf node and root of the tree are Key Encryption Keys (KEKs); the keys at the leaves of the tree are data encryption keys owned by group members; the root key is the GK. In the basic MIKEY protocol, MSK is the GK, and there is no KEK to facilitate the distribution of the GKs.
There are two types of security that a key distribution algorithm can provide: backward security, meaning that a new member is not able to decrypt past group communications, and forward security, meaning that a departing member is not able to decrypt future group communications. To maintain backward and forward security, when a user joins or leaves, all the keys on the path have to be changed. For a join or leave event, the communication overhead is OðlogNÞ. If the forward and backward security requirement is relaxed, batch rekeying may be performed to reduce the overhead as discussed below.
The four schemes for delivering hierarchical location information and the corresponding four LKH extensions each have trade-offs in terms of message delivery efficiency and group management complexity. We discuss the efficiency of rekeying for the different methods of distributing the hierarchically coded location information below. To quantify this overhead, we define the following variables:
. N: number of users in the group, h: height of the tree ðh ¼ log NÞ. . K: encrypted key size, E: cost of encryption operation, D: cost of decryption operation. . C m : overhead in terms of bytes for method m, P : overhead for delivering a rekeying packet. . r c : ratio of users of class c in terms of percentage, c max : the maximum location classes or subgroups. Table 2 summarizes the messaging, storage, and computation overhead for the basic LKH scheme. The overhead for rekeying in the basic LKH scheme is given by
Coding by Information Class
The key server needs to maintain separate groups for each class of location information. A user must subscribe to multiple groups to receive more than one granularity of location information. When rekeying due to a join or leave event, a new key must be distributed to all users that subscribe to the same classes of location information. The tree structure is shown in Fig. 3a . The cost of rekeying may be expressed as
Each user of class i must store P i j¼1 ðh j þ 1Þ keys for each level of location information it wishes to receive, where h j is the height of the key tree of group level j. The number of multicast groups managed is the same as the number of classes of location information.
Coding by Group
Each group rekeys independently of all other groups. Therefore, if rekeying is performed on a join of leave of a user in group, only those users in group i must be rekeyed. The tree structure is shown in Fig. 3b . The rekeying procedures follow the basic rekeying protocol as for the basic LKH scheme. The cost of rekeying may be expressed as
Each user must store ð1 þ h i Þ keys, where h i is the height of the key tree of group i. Again, the number of multicast groups is equal to the number of location classes.
Nested Hierarchy Coding
For nested hierarchical coding, a modified LKH tree can be used. The basic assumption for LKH is that the user knows the keys from the leaf (itself) up to the root, and the root key is the GK. In our definition, this is still true, but the modified LKH tree is not a balanced tree, while each subgroup is still a balanced tree. The height of the tree is decided by the biggest group and is in general Oðlog NÞ. The tree structure is shown in Fig. 3c .
When a user joins a group, the server adds the user to the appropriate group. The key server will change the keys on the path between the root and the new user. A similar rekeying takes place when a user leaves the tree. Note that when a user with a low priority rekeys, only one GK, K g1 , needs to be changed. When a highest class user, class c, rekeys, all the GKs must be changed. This will be efficient if there are many more low priority users than high priority users. In general, the rekeying overhead for the nested method is
A user in class c must store c þ h c keys. This includes one for each class of location information it will access ðcÞ, plus the height of the tree of its group, h c .
Flat Encryption
To make the protocol more general, the flat encryption scheme does not rely on information hierarchy and assumes a flat relationship among subgroups. Each subgroup is still a balanced tree, and the key server maintains the information subscription mapping among subgroups. The tree structure is shown in Fig. 3d .
When a user joins a group, the key server decides in which subgroup to put the logical node for the user. The rekeying message will be handled by all the relative subgroups. For example, if a user joins subgroup c, all the subgroups keys need be changed. The rekeying overhead for this scheme is
Each user must store ðc þ h c þ 1Þ keys, where c is the class of the user, and h c is the height of the c-class tree.
Batch Rekeying
Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4 derive equations to quantify the average rekeying overhead for the four schemes. If the policy is to rekey on each join or leave event, the overhead calculated above occurs at the rate of the join and leaves. Batch rekeying can be used to reduce the rekeying overhead. In this case, the rekeying only happens when a time threshold or count threshold is met. The trade-off for batch removal is that we can only support weaker forward security because the keys are not updated immediately.
Note that different policies may be applied to different classes of information. For example, batch rekeying may be performed on the low granularity classes, and join/leave rekeying may be performed on the higher levels of granularity information.
Key Distribution Schemes Analysis and Discussion
Based on the four hierarchical coding schemes, we can deduce the average height of the tree with the different location precision levels. In this section, we first analyze the performance of each keying scheme related to group dynamics assuming rekeying based on join/leave events. Then, we show the batch rekeying results for two typical group sizes. Finally, we discuss the trade-offs of the various methods described above. We assume the ratio among the five different subgroups is r 1 : r 2 : r 3 : r 4 : r 5 . We set the join/leave rate to be 100/hour. The size of an encrypted key is K ¼ 20 bytes, and the protocol overhead is P ¼ 50 bytes. The overall overhead for rekeying is then simply C method ðNÞ, where C method is the byte overhead of rekeying for each method as defined in (2)- (5).
In Fig. 4 , we show the overhead for r 1 : r 2 : r 3 : r 4 : r 5 ¼ 30 : 10 : 8 : 5 : 2. This represents a system in which many users have access to low granularity location information (e.g., country or state), and few have access to high precision location information. From the figure, we can see that the three schemes (group, nested, and flat) that accommodate hierarchical coding of location information have better performance than the direct application of LKH (coding by class) in terms of rekeying cost. The most efficient scheme in this respect is coding by group, i.e., each user group receives all data under a single key. This is intuitively most efficient as it requires rekeying only for users directly affected by the group membership change. With this ratio, nested coding is more efficient than flat coding.
If we reverse the ratio r 1 : r 2 : r 3 : r 4 : r 5 ¼ 2 : 5 : 8 : 10 : 30, we see increasing overhead for the coding by class scheme because more users subscribe to multiple groups (not shown). This represents a system in which many users have access to high precision location information. In this case, the three schemes that accommodate hierarchical encoding perform similarly. Fig. 5 shows how batch rekeying can further reduce the rekeying overhead in the worst case. We assume interarrival time of rekeying members conforms to a normal distribution and are equally distributed among the subtrees. With the smallest batch interval of 5 minutes, the rekeying overhead can be reduced by half. Batch time or batch count should be chosen based on N and the join/leave rate. In Fig. 5 , with typically a small group ðN ¼ 100Þ, a 5-minute batch interval is enough to reduce the rekeying overhead to around 10 Kbyte/h. In contrast, for a large group (N ¼ 800, not shown), to accommodate the similar bandwidth, the batch interval has to be set to 25 minutes. The overheads for coding by group scheme are the same for both ratios.
Figs. 6 and 7 show how flexible batch policies can be applied on different location levels. For example, a user may not care about people knowing a short history of their country and state information, and thus apply batch rekeying to these low granularity information classes, perhaps performing rekeying once in the morning and once at night. For more precise location information, they may mandate rekeying upon join/leave events to ensure forward and backward security. We assume the interarrival time of rekeying members conforms to a normal distribution and are equally distributed among the subtrees. Both figures show that the rekeying overhead optimization depends on the size of the nonbatch rekeying groups. When there are more people in higher level location groups, the overhead does not decrease dramatically below 10 Kbyte/h even when 12-hour batch rekeying is configured for four levels of location information. When the precise location information is shared with only small groups of people, 12-hour batch rekeying for the country and state information reduces the overhead to within 10 Kbyte/h. This holds true for both the small group and the large groups in Figs. 6 and 7 .
The trade-offs of the various methods described above are summarized in Table 3 .
The coding by class scheme is the direct application of the basic LKH scheme. The coding by group solution is attractive for four reasons. First, it results in low rekeying overhead, as shown in Figs. 4 and 5 . Second, the delivery of messages is efficient because users only receive the data they require. Third, each user receives the data at and below their maximum class level. This potentially simplifies service logic because the recipients of the high granularity data do not have to process it to derive the lower granularity information. Finally, the key storage requirements on each user device are low.
The main drawback of the coding by group solution is that there are c groups to be managed from both a rekeying and data dissemination perspective. From a rekeying perspective, a tree for each group is maintained. From a data dissemination perspective, each group is delivered a message containing only the data they request.
Like the coding by group solution, with the nested coding solution, a user receives all the data at and below its maximum level. It has an additional benefit in that only a single multicast group must be maintained for data dissemination and rekeying.
The flat coding scheme is the most flexible from the user perspective. In this scheme, a user may only join the groups they desire. Likewise, this method allows users more flexibility in deciding which data to disseminate. It provides the possibility that a user may receive all data at or below their maximum level if so desired.
MIKEY-LKH PROTOCOL AND REBALANCE ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we define the key management protocol in detail. It is intuitive to use a binary key tree-based solution for rekeying in which the basic insert or delete operations happen only on the leaf nodes. However, this may lead to an imbalanced tree which results in poor performance. We address this problem in Section 6.2.
MIKEY-LKH-Based Group Key Management Protocol
Below we describe the details of our MIKEY-LKH-based GK management protocol. For the sake of clarity, assume the GS is running this protocol. As previously discussed, it can be run on the end device. When a user joins a location information group, the initial key distribution is made by encapsulating the key information message over an SSL/TLS channel.
The rekeying protocol is the focus of our GK management. The KEKs along the key tree path to the tree root are used to encode/decode the updated keys; the GK information is then multicast to group members. The rekey message uses the following format: . Hdr is the message header; T S is the time stamp;
ID S is the sender ID of the server. . KEK is the Key Encryption Key; GK is the Group Key; GK 0 is the old GK; ID K is the ID of the key K. . m is the number of the updated keys. . KEK child i is the KEK of KEK i 's child node, where 0 < i < m. . MACðK A ; HjMÞ is a Message Authentication Code of values H and M, using key K A . . fMg <K> is a value M encrypted in key K. . fKDatag m is the encrypted keys payload carried in the message. The key payload in the MIKEY message is extended to support the Key ID list information and KEKs for the LKH scheme. The four LKH extensions introduced in Section 5.1 have different key data payloads corresponding to their key tree structures. Only one multicast message is sent for the nested and the coding by group schemes when a member joins or leaves. More rekeying messages are sent out for the coding by information and the flat schemes depending on the desired location information granularity.
The time stamp (TS) in the rekeying message is used for replay protection. AES with a 128-bit key is used for encryption and decryption. HMAC-SHA1 is used for the Message Authentication Code which covers an entire message.
Key Tree Rebalancing
The size of key data payload carried in the MIKEY message introduced in Section 6.1 has direct impact on the rekeying protocol performance. In general, for a balanced binary tree with N leaves, the distance from the root to any leaf is logN. A tree is balanced if the distances from the root node to any two leaf nodes differ by no more than one [21] , [36] . But if the tree becomes unbalanced, the distance from the root to a leaf can become as high as N. This may degrade the rekeying overhead from OðlogNÞ to OðNÞ. It is desirable to keep a key management tree as balanced as possible.
Moyer et al. [22] propose two enhancements to rebalance the key tree after removing a member. The first method is to find a member at the deepest tree level to replace the deleted member. This method has up to 4h cost, where h is the height of the tree. The second method only invokes the rebalance operation periodically. This solution may incur high overhead since it only replaces one node at a time. This motivates our modified AVL (M_AVL) algorithm which utilizes batch swapping among subtrees instead of separate node replacement.
We define algorithms for Insert and Remove operations and implement them in our GS. We further propose a batch group member removal algorithm to optimize the rekeying performance. The performance of our key tree algorithms is evaluated in Section 8. We consider a general Balanced Binary Tree [37] in which not all nodes conform to the balance condition. We allow the tree to have any shape as long as the tree is general balanced, e.g., keeps the logarithmic tree height. Such a balance definition results in a super class of all other classes of balanced trees which is especially useful to design an optimized key tree algorithm.
Algorithm 1. Insert
Input: A new TreeNode n, a M_AVLTree T the new node to be inserted; Output: A list L of tree nodes with keys to be changed; Procedure: 1: if T is empty then 2: insert n into the empty tree T 3: else if T is full then 4: create a new root node P 5: current root becomes the left child of P 6: n becomes the right child of P 7: else 8: find a shallowest node S 9: create a new internal node B 10:
S becomes the left child of B and n becomes the right child of B 11: B becomes the child of S's parent 12: end if 13: update node information along the insertion path and add the nodes into L 14: return L
Algorithm 2. RemoveOneNode
Input: A TreeNode n, a M_AVLTree T the node to be removed; Output: A list L of tree nodes with keys to be changed; Procedure: 1: if T is empty then 2: return the empty L 3: else if n is the child of the root of T then 4: remove current root node of T and n 5: the sibling node of n becomes the root of T 6: else 7: find the parent node P of n, and the parent Gp of P 8: the sibling node of n becomes the child of Gp 9: remove n and P 10: end if 11: update node information along the removal path and add the nodes into L 12: return L
Algorithm 3. Remove
Input: A TreeNode n, a M_AVLTree T the node to be removed; Output: A list L of tree nodes with keys to be changed update node information along the two paths and add new nodes into L 6: end while 7: return L The general balance rule is defined as follows:
where c, b is constant, c >¼ 1, h is the height of the tree.
We define the M_AVL algorithm to maintain the key tree balance when members join or leave the group. In addition to the general balance rule, we have the following assumptions:
. First, in our M_AVL tree, there are two types of nodes: internal nodes and leaf nodes [37] . We allow mixed type descendants on internal nodes which reduces the number of keys to change when rekeying is necessary. . Second, we define the internal nodes as logical nodes for the purpose of KEKs. The leaf nodes which represent a member have the KEKs along the path to the root. . Finally, we note three differences between our Modified AVL tree and the original AVL tree. The original AVL is a balanced binary search tree, while the M_AVL is a general balanced tree. Another difference is that the group member is stored only at the leaf nodes. The internal nodes are logical nodes which save the KEK information. A third difference is that the M_AVL tree does not have to keep the order of the members. Fig. 8 shows an M_AVL key tree structure. Although the root node does not conform to the original AVL balance condition, the tree is generally balanced ðN ¼ 5; c ¼ 1; b ¼ 1Þ. If node U5 is a newly inserted node, using M_AVL can minimize the keys to be changed since the inserting path is short. When a member leaves, our algorithm checks the longest path to the deepest node, determines the highest relative balanced subtree, and determines the shallowest most unbalance subtree. We switch the heads of two subtrees to rebalance the key tree.
We support two basic key tree operations: Insert and Remove. The internal node stores the path information to the deepest and shallowest nodes. We use an auxiliary data structure, member hash table, in our implementation. The member hash table allows us to locate any member node in constant time, given the member ID.
To further improve the rekeying performance of the rebalancing algorithm, we support batch removal in which rekeying upon a member leaving is only performed after a time threshold or count threshold.
The Insert, Remove, Rebalance, and Batch Removal algorithms are shown in Algorithms 1 to 4.
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we discuss the design and implementation of the components for our location-based system. Our LBS system is designed to be network and protocol independent. We take an approach to separate the application service logic and the network functionality, as shown in Fig. 9 . We implement our LBS system on Java 2 Standard Edition (J2SE) because it is widely supported by laptops and desktops; a similar implementation may be done with J2ME. We first describe the implementation of the network functions, namely the LS and the GS, which provide common interfaces to the user and the AS to develop various LBSs. Finally, we describe two services, LocateFriends and BuddyAlert, which are implemented on an enhanced Instant Message Server (LeIM Server); we also include the location-enhanced instant message client.
Location Management
An LBS AS has to interact with the LS for accessing a user's location to deliver required services. Different approaches can be followed for realizing the location service interface. Existing location interface implementations typically work with only one network and are not extensible. Our interface is implemented using SOAP/RPC over HTTPs web service. This is available for most wireless users using an Internet service model. We delegate the interaction with the LS to the GS in our system which takes advantage of the GK management introduced in Section 5. The AS simply joins a user's location group to receive the location information distributed from the GS. The LS provides the Common APIs for the location service interface which basically includes location update and location query.
The LS provides location management logic and a location service interface, as shown in Fig. 10 . The positioning functionality on the client is also demonstrated. The basic location service common APIs are further summarized in Table 4 . Two different categories of query services are supported: pull and push, with respect to how the location information is accessed. Fig. 10 shows a representative example of location update and pull-based location information access. Method publishLocation is used by the users to update their location to the LS. Methods subscribeLocation and getUserLocation are used by applications to request location subscription and get one-time location information, respectively. Fig. 10 is easily modified to support pushbased scenarios in which the location information is pushed to the ASs at a specified frequency or in response to a specified event. Methods subscribeLocation, startLocNotification, and endLocNotification are used for this purpose.
We support the GPS location tracking functionality in the client location agent with the Location package. A nice feature of our location tracking module is the wrapper class which is used as an abstract interface independent of underlying positioning techniques. A standard NMEA GPS sentence is collected through methods implemented based on the Java Native Interface (JNI), thus allowing platformspecific location drivers to be written in another language and accessed by Java. The Rayming TN200 USB GPS receiver is used as the external GPS device attached to the laptop on which we deploy the client applications.
Group Management
Group management is the core part of our LBS system. The cryptographic key distribution method and the multicast service described in Section 5 are implemented in this component. IP multicast is used to efficiently deliver location information to the users in a location group. Fig. 11 shows the group management software framework in detail. We decompose the features into function managers on the server and relative function agent modules on the user equipment and ASs.
The GS provides the Common APIs for the group service interface which are summarized in Table 4 . In our LBS system, the GS delegates the LS access for the AS. Similar to the LS introduced in Section 7.2, pull-based location information access is also supported through unicast. Push-based location information dissemination exploits the advantages of IP multicast. We describe the implementation Methods startInfoMulticast and endInfoMulticast are invoked by users to start and end the distribution of information. Alternatively, we support pull-based location information unicast with methods pullUnicastInfo and bulkPullUnicastInfo. Methods joinGroup, leaveGroup, bulkJoinGroup, and bulkLeaveGroup are used by users or ASs to join and leave the multicast group(s) delegated in the GS.
The GServer package implements the group management server functions, as shown in Fig. 11 . Multiple threads are forked by a message dispatcher thread in order to handle multiple requests from the members. Class MulticastCommManager implements the global multicast communication manager which controls the multicast sockets and threads for each group indexed by the group name. A set of multicast sockets and threads are used when we consider coding by information, coding by group, and flat coding schemes. The nested coding scheme uses only one multicast socket and thread since the information is encoded in a nested way. SecureMulticast class implements the multicast interfaces for join (sendJoinKEKs()) and leave rekeying (sendLeaveKEKs()) and location information distribution (sendLocationMulticastMessage()).
The KeyTree package implements the LKH extension and our four key tree schemes. The M_AVL key tree algorithm introduced in Section 5 is included in this package. Class KeyTreesManager implements the global key tree manager which provides the insertKeyTree(), deleteKeyTree(), and getKeyTree() interfaces used by the GServer package. Interface KeyTree defines the key tree APIs including insert() and remove() and other utility APIs which can be used by the GServer package to manipulate the GK trees.
The Java Cryptographic Extension (JCE) provides a framework for encryption/decryption, key generation and key agreement, and Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithms.
Application Server and User Client 7.3.1 Multilevel Location Sharing to Improve Mobile Network Services Experience
In this section. we discuss how multilevel location sharing can enable more sophisticated social experience in LBSs. When games are designed for mobile devices, the player's location (even if relative) and movement can be incorporated into the game. This might include tracking a phone as it moves in addition to monitoring players' direction, velocity and acceleration. When multiple players are cooperating, the location information can be shared among them together with other private information. Botfighters2 and CitiTag make use of single level of players' location (or the most precise location) and collaboration among members when they are in proximity [38] . It might be interesting to share different levels of location information with different subgroups inside a guild. Guilds are often cited as an important factor contributing to MMORPG's popularity. For example, merging neighbor groups by sharing coarse level location information can improve the group power and social experience.
Applications Implementation
To exercise our system, we implement two services, LocateFriends and BuddyAlert, on the AS as enhancements to IM services. These may be viewed as standalone services, or building blocks for the games previously discussed.
The two services belong to push-based LBSs. The friends' location information is multicast to users periodically after they join the group. The core logic provides continuous sharing of location information at different granularity. We implement the services using the XMPP (Message and Presence Protocol) protocol. We use the Wildfire IM Server and Spark client development package [39] , [40] .
LocateFriends is an example in which the user application interacts with the GS directly for the basic location sharing. The application directly uses the group service framework APIs as described in Section 7.2. The UE component in Fig. 11 shows the detail functionalities on the client.
The roster information provided by the Spark IM Client development package is used to edit the authorization list and subscription list information for a client, i.e., its location information groups. The configuration information is composed into a createGroup message and sent to the GS when the user clicks the Invite button. The user is a member of their own location groups by default, and the initial keys are returned with the response. The user will encrypt the location information using the GKs. Clients can configure the subscription list and include it in the joinGroup message sent to the GS. The client will get a Join Reply message which contains the initial key information along the key tree insertion path.
A simplified flow for privacy control and location sharing is shown in Fig. 12 . The user may receive rekeying or location multicast messages from the GS after it joins the group. Fig. 13 shows the location information displayed on different LocateFriends clients at different granularity. The BuddyAlert service is also a push-based continuous tracking service. The AS component shown in Fig. 11 demonstrates the software framework to build the services. The AS joins the multicast group of the buddies and receives the multicast message pushed from the GS periodically. Then, the application checks the proximity of the user and its buddies. The users get an alert message from the AS when the predefined buddies are within the proximity of each other. This is an application example which uses the group service framework and adds custom service logic on the AS.
The IMServerPushExt packages implement the BuddyAlert service on the IM Server based on the models explained above. Push-based group service framework APIs are used to implement the basic logic similar to the LocateFriends. Simple service logic is designed to alert buddies when they are within a requested proximity, for example, in the same city.
The plugin.locationgroups package implements the client plugin to support the location extension based on the Spark IM Client. The client uses the same interface to configure its location sharing profile which includes its buddies and the AS.
Rekeying Enforcement for Location Sharing Policy in IM Services
Our system is scalable in the face of high group dynamics. In this section, we describe a practical rekeying scheme for Location Sharing in IM services.
In social networks such as Facebook, people are usually involved in several community groups. In general, tightly coupled groups are small (< 100) in which people share precise location and require timely location updates. The sharing relationship is stable so that key management overhead is not prominent. Using key trees allows flexible location privacy control as discussed in previous sections, but the rebalance operation can be disabled. Loosely coupled groups are normally large, and people share coarse location information and require less frequent location updates.
The user still has control over their location information access. For each group, the user can define a batch period for rekeying, or mandate join/leave rekeying. For each period, the user can define service activation/deactivation time for each member or subgroup. The user can specify different policies when members become offline to avoid unwanted logging. The user can also define how often this level of location information should be updated/pushed to the group.
For example, Olly is in several social communities and has coworkers, friends, family members, and club people on his buddy list. He defines his location information sharing groups. Fig. 14 shows the social network relations and the mapping of location information groups. The members under the same community are inserted into the same subtree; this can help to simplify the group management and the rekeying although maintaining multiple groups is also feasible.
We introduce an activation/deactivation time for each member or community group. When it is time to deactivate a member, rekeying occurs but the node is not removed from the tree. Instead, the node is marked and an activation timer is set for the node. At the same time, it is inserted into the activation pending list.
A similar scheme is applied when members logout. The user will receive new keys encrypted with the old key when they become active again. If there is no rekeying during this interval, the node is removed from the pending list.
For example, Olly configures his location profile for his managers which will be activated/deactivated on 9:00 a.m./ 6:00 p.m. during weekdays. When his manager becomes offline, rekeying will occur to avoid offline location tracking. When Olly comes to work at 9:00 a.m., the members on the pending list will be rekeyed. The latest keys on the path to the root will be encoded with the old key which could be cached on the member nodes. The managers now can see Olly's location without any explicit rejoining. The rebalance feature is disabled since the social network of a user is stable.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following, we present the results of the load tests performed on our system for large group applications. The four different key distribution schemes are considered. We evaluate the system in two parts: key management overhead and memory cost for group management; location update overhead for service performance.
Simulation Model and Test Bed
We assume a situation in which the system is deployed in a company with a large number of employees. We focus on the performance of the system considering the typical dynamics of group applications. Thus, we evaluate the performance over a period of time in which we model the behavior of users based on previous studies of group dynamics in the MBone [41] , [42] . This does not apply to the flexible privacy enforcement model we discussed in Section 7.3.3 which incurs less overhead. We demonstrate a case in which one person shares their location information with a large group of 800 people at different granularity. The user could be a person serving for a department such as a secretary or a lab support. It can also be used to deploy event-based location sharing in large social networks and community services. The LocateFriends client is used as the simulation application for the load test. To allow fine-grained location privacy control and demonstrate the group dynamics, we consider user login/logout as group joining/leaving events. This demonstrates system scalability in the worst case.
We assume people join the group during a concentrated period of time (e.g., when they arrive at work), and use the message service for about 2 hours each day. Therefore, the average interarrival time for users joining the group is relatively low (20 seconds); once a user has joined they remain in the group for an average of 2 hours. Once a user leaves the group, they do not rejoin. The user interarrival time and membership duration are exponentially distribution in a relatively concentrated period of time [41] . We assume that the location information class that the users desire is uniformly distributed.
Our measurements were made in 15-minute intervals for 17 hours, the first 10 of which are presented here. We limit our presentation to the first 10 hours because this is when the network dynamics are highest. The results we have shown here are not meant to be taken as absolute, but to show the trends and comparative results. We summarize these parameters in Table 5 .
To evaluate the performance of the system. we set up a test bed consisting of three machines running windows XP. The GS is hosted on a machine with a Pentium M 2.00-GHz processor and 1.50-Gbyte RAM. The LS and Location-enhanced Instant Message Server are installed on a second machine with a Pentium M 1.50-GHz processor and 1.0-Gbyte RAM. A third machine with a Pentium M 1.30-GHz processor and 1.0-Gbyte RAM is used to simulate the user behavior of a large group.
Key Management Overhead
In the following sections, we first evaluate the rebalancing algorithm and batch removal scheme. Then, we show the rekeying overhead in terms of the average number of key changes and rebalance operations. Furthermore, the bandwidth cost and the average server processing time of rekeying are measured and analyzed in order to identify the benefits and performance impact of the different schemes. Fig. 15 shows the size of the groups and number of key tree nodes (including internal and external nodes) over the simulation period. Fig. 16 shows the number of users leaving in each 15-minute interval. We do not show the number of users joining over time due to space limitations. Please refer to Fig. 16 when interpreting the remainder of the results. 
Key Tree Rebalance Performance
We first evaluate the performance of the rebalancing algorithm and the batch removal optimization with the coding by GK distribution scheme. As seen in Figs. 17 and 18, the tree height with rebalancing is close to the ideal value, which is an improvement of about 15 percent over when rebalancing is not used. This helps achieve better performance with fewer key changes when a member joins or leaves a group. Furthermore, if batch removal is applied with a threshold of 5 minutes, multicast traffic is reduced by over 50 percent. The tree height with batch removal is still similar to the ideal case, as shown in Fig. 17. 
Rekeying Key Changes Benchmarks
The rekeying benchmarks are conducted to characterize the load for different key distribution schemes. Fig. 19 shows the average number of rekeys the server needs to perform due to members leaving a group according to the intensities of Fig. 16 . The results for users joining the group are similar.
The three schemes (group, nested, and flat) that accommodate hierarchical coding of location information all have fewer key changes than the direct application of LKH (coding by information class). Due to the M_AVL algorithm, the key trees are generally balanced and the key changes are lower than the height of the tree. When a member leaves the group, the rebalancing function may incur additional key changes because of the swap operations. We found that the average number of swap operations per leave was 0.46 with a variance ð 2 Þ of 0.35. This did not degrade the performance of the rebalancing algorithm.
The most efficient scheme in this respect is coding by group, in which each user group receives all data under a single key. This is intuitively the most efficient for as it requires rekeying only for users directly affected by the group membership change. Fig. 20 depicts the bandwidth overhead of the four schemes incurred for users leaving a group with the leave rate shown in Fig. 16 . Similar results for users joining a group are not shown due to space limitations. Except for the flat coding scheme, the bandwidth cost conforms to the key change curves of the different schemes. The rekeying bandwidth cost of the flat scheme is relatively higher than the nested scheme, whereas in Fig. 19 , the rekey key changes of the two schemes are almost the same. The main reason is that for the flat scheme, one GK needs to be multicast multiple times to subgroups. The most efficient schemes in this respect are coding by group and the nested coding.
Rekeying Bandwidth Overhead
Server Rekeying Processing Time
The server processing time measured here is exclusively the server side cost for the group management. In the GS implementation, multiple threads are forked in order to serve multiple requests. Since the system resources are restricted, the average processing time tends to increase when more users join or leave the system. We exclude the SSL handshake cost and the transmission time in our measurements because these are independent of our schemes. Fig. 21 shows the average rekeying processing time on the server for the different schemes. The figure depicts the average server processing overhead for each leave operation over time for the leave rates shown in Fig. 16 . These results show that the processing overhead on the server is very low. Fig. 22 shows the average memory cost on the server for the different schemes over time according to the leave rates of Fig. 16 .
Group Management Memory Overhead
The client must save the KEKs and the GKs to decode the rekeying and location messages. The number of initial keys after joining the group owned by a client is in general comparable to the height of the tree for the three schemes (group, nested, and flat). The coding by information class scheme is the worst in this respect.
Location Update Overhead
In this section, we consider the scalability of the system in the face of user mobility. Recall that we have a single user generating location information that is sent to a group of up to 800 people. Each time the user moves sufficiently to change the location information of one or more location classes, the information in the database must be updated. For tracking applications, this information must also be disseminated to users.
We choose two simple models, high mobility and low mobility, to represent the single user's location update traffic. For example, a high mobility user changes their highest level of granularity (level 5) location information every 0.5 hour on average. The user's level 4 and level 3 location information are changed every 2 and 4 hours, respectively. A low mobility user only changes their level 5 and level 4 location information every 2 and 4 hours on average, respectively. The location update interval conforms to an exponential distribution.
The updated information is multicast to the group members as soon as it changes due to the user mobility. These results are therefore applicable to push-based services. Fig. 23 shows the results. The flat scheme does not scale to high mobility because the location information with lower granularity needs to multicast to multiple subgroups. The other three schemes are comparable and scale to high mobility.
From the server's perspective, only one multicast message that includes all levels of the updated information needs to be sent for the nested scheme. This means fewer multicast groups and multicast sockets are managed on the server. For the other three schemes, multiple multicast messages are sent, and each of the messages includes only one level of location information.
From the clients' perspective, the group scheme is desirable since they only need to handle one multicast message and decode once to get all the information. With nested coding, the client needs to handle one multicast message but still has to decode multiple times to get all classes of location information. For the flat scheme, the client handles one multicast message and also has to decode multiple times to get all the information. For the information class schemes, the client handles multiple multicast messages and also has to decode multiple times to get all the information.
Nested coding incurs overhead for the user when they desire only a single class of location information because all classes up to the desired class must be decoded. To make nested coding more efficient, we can make the following change: location information of different classes are encoded separately and organized in a flat way and sent in one multicast message.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the trade-offs of the various schemes described above.
The coding by class scheme does not scale well from the key management perspective if multiple information levels are extensively used. The scheme is only effective if a single group is dominant in which case the LKH scheme directly applies.
The flat coding scheme is the most flexible from the user or the AS perspective. In this scheme, users or ASs only join the groups directly corresponding to the classes of information they desire. The scheme does not scale to high mobility but may be used for pull-based applications where the impact of the mobility is not critical.
The coding by group and the nested coding solutions are attractive for the following reasons. First, they both result in low rekeying overhead. Second, each user receives the data at and below their maximum class level. This potentially simplifies service logic because the recipients of the high granularity data do not have to process it to derive the lower granularity information. For example, when a high priority user receives the ðx; yÞ coordinates of a peer, it will also receive the state location of the peer and not have to derive it itself. Finally, the key storage requirements on each user device are low.
The processing of messages is efficient for users in the coding by group scheme, because they only receive the data they require and decode once. This is desirable for devices with limited system resources and computation power. On the contrary, for nested coding, the processing overhead on high priority users is high because they must decrypt data c times to retrieve all classes of data.
Nested coding is attractive in that only a single multicast group, thus a single multicast address and socket, is maintained for data dissemination and rekeying on the server. This simplifies the implementation logic and reduces the system resources required on the server.
OPEN-SERVICE ARCHITECTURE ENHANCEMENT
Next-generation networks are expected to support services across heterogeneous networks regardless of the terminal used. The lack of a global standard for location information transport is a hindrance for service providers. The intent of the Open-Service Access/Parlay (OSA/Parlay) [43] is to provide an object-oriented architectural model which can be viewed as an abstract network layer to expose network services in a secured and controlled manner. This architecture is targeted to bridge traditional telecommunication networks and IP-based networks to provide a mobile virtual network from different operators.
ParlayX provides web service interfaces [43] which can be used by loosely coupled ASs to stimulate service development outside of traditional telecommunication players. These interfaces include third-party call delivery, conferencing, messaging, and user presence and location information.
Each OSA/Parlay API provides an interface to the network and the application. The former, implemented by the network operator, interacts with core network elements, while the latter is deployed by applications and services in order to interact with the network. The communication between the network and application follows an asynchronous client-server model using standard middleware infrastructure. When applications perform remote method invocations, call back objects are generated in the application side in order to receive the network results. Two possible middleware options for implementation are the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) or the SOAP over HTTP Web Service technology. OSA/Parlay has specified the interfaces using both the Interface Definition Language (IDL) for CORBA and the Web Services Description Language (WSDL). The architectural model is also enhanced with security capabilities, offered by the OSA/Parlay framework API to support authentication and authorization mechanisms. The SOAP approach has higher response time and uses plain text transmission while CORBA outperforms the former. On the other hand, SOAP is easy to develop and deploy. Both middleware gateways consist of international standards, which guarantee interoperability between different platforms or implementations.
Our system framework is designed to be extensible and provides common APIs, as described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. The APIs can be mapped to ParlayX methods [43] , and our LS can function as a proxy in between the AS and the core network.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a framework to support privacy-enhanced LBSs and a practical LBS system implementation. The key idea behind the system is to hierarchically encrypt location information under different keys, and distribute the appropriate keys only to group members with permission to see the location information at that granularity. The common APIs of the framework allow applications to access the location information at different levels of granularity regardless of the network and protocols.
We propose rekeying through the application of the LKH protocol. We modify MIKEY to accommodate LKH and the four different hierarchical location information dissemination methods. We implement the proposed extensions in our LBS system and conduct the load test to examine the system scalability and efficiency. We then discuss the extension of the system architecture to an openservice architecture. This architecture is ideal for a service model in which a single operator does not have direct control over all service elements. 
